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Abstract— In this paper, we investigate the tradeoff between
performance and confidentiality in signature-based air indexing
schemes for wireless data broadcast. Two metrics, namely false
drop probability and false guess probability, are defined to quantify
the filtering efficiency and confidentiality loss of a signature
scheme. Our analysis reveals that false drop probability and
false guess probability share a similar trend as the tuning
parameters of a signature scheme change and it is impossible
to achieve a low false drop probability and a high false guess
probability simultaneously. In order to balance the performance
and confidentiality, we perform an analysis to provide a guidance
for parameter settings of the signature schemes to meet different
system requirements. In addition, we propose the jump pointer
technique and the XOR signature scheme to further improve the
performance and confidentiality. A comprehensive simulation has
been conducted to validate our findings.
I. INTRODUCTION
For years, we have envisaged a vision in which the use of
high-speed wireless devices will facilitate users to watch videos,
share pictures, held remote meetings, socialize with friends, and
perform many tasks from anywhere at anytime. This vision has
come very close to a reality. Exciting news include Intel’s plans
to embed WiMAX-enabling chips in laptops by the end of 2008,
AT&T provides ’All-Access Pass’ to the 2008 Olympic Games,
and Google TiSP enables FREE in-home wireless broadband
service in U.S. and Canada while developing a mobile feature
called TiSP on the Run (TiSPOTR) which can provide free
wireless broadband service even when the customers are away
from the home.
Today, there are many wireless technologies (e.g., Bluetooth,
IEEE 802.11, UMTS, Satellite, etc) that could be integrated
to construct a seamless, pervasive information access platform.
Logically, information access via these wireless technologies
can be classified into two basic approaches: on-demand access
and periodic broadcast. On-demand access employs a pull-based
approach where a mobile client initiates a query to the server
which in turn processes the query and returns the result to the
client over a point-to-point channel. On-demand access is suitable
for lightly loaded systems in which server processing capacity and
wireless channels are not severely contended.
On the other hand, periodic broadcast requires the server to
pro-actively push data to the clients over a dedicated broad-
cast channel. This approach allows an arbitrary number of
clients to access data simultaneously, and thus is particularly
suitable for heavily loaded systems. Wireless data broadcast
services have been available as commercial products for many
years, e.g. StarBand (www.starband.com) and Hughes Network
(go.gethughesnet.com). Recently, there has been a push for
such systems from the industry and various standard bodies.
For example, born out of the International Telecommunication
Union’s (ITU) International Mobile Telecommunications “IMT-
2000” initiative, the Third Generation Partnership Project 2
(www.3gpp2.org) is developing Broadcast and Multicast Service
in cdma2000 Wireless IP network.
In a wireless data broadcast environment, clients with appropri-
ate equipments can monitor the broadcast channel and log the data
items being broadcast. As a result, if the broadcast data items are
not encrypted, their content is open to the public (i.e., any person
can access it for free). Key-based encryption is a natural choice
for ensuring secure access of data on air (i.e., only subscribers
who own valid keys can decrypt the received packets to access the
data items). However, a search for broadcast data items needs to
first receive all the broadcast data items off the air for decryption
and further processing (i.e., filtering out unwanted data items). In
other words, no matter how many data items a client requests, she
has to download and decrypt all the data items, which consumes
energy significantly.
To help alleviate the high cost of receiving, decrypting and
filtering broadcast data, auxiliary information can be provided on
the broadcast channel to annotate the broadcast data items. This
technique is called air indexing. The basic idea is that, based
on index information broadcast along with data items (including
indexed attribute values, arrival schedule, length of data items,
etc.), mobile clients can skip the retrieval of unwanted data items
via tuning into doze mode and switch back to active mode only
when the data of desire arrives. Existing air indexing techniques
mainly focus on the search performance issues, i.e., designing
index structures and corresponding search algorithms to enable
fast data retrieval.
Differently, the work presented in this paper tries to address
both performance and confidentiality issues of wireless data
broadcast services. We propose to use signature-based air index
which is a typical approximate index. It uses a fixed length bit-
vector (i.e., a signature) to encode all the indexed attributes and
clients can check whether a data item satisfies the query by only
checking its corresponding signature. However, a signature is an
abstract of the real attribute values and different items may share
the same signature. A match between a signature and the query
does not guarantee that the real data item actually satisfies the
query. Consequently, a signature keeps some uncertainty of the
indexed data item that may deteriorate the search performance.
From aspect of confidentiality, the approximate nature of the
signature is desirable as it actually hides partial information from
the public. The index information (i.e., signature), even broadcast
in a non-encrypted form, prevents unauthorized attackers to infer
data content on broadcast. This work studies the tradeoff between
performance and confidentiality of different signature settings, by
analysis and experimentation. In addition, we take a step further
to enhance the performance and confidentiality of signature-based
index by incorporating the jump pointer technique and the XOR
operation. The main contributions of our study are five-fold.
• The issue of confidentiality loss in air indexing is, to the
best knowledge of the authors, identified and studied for the
first time in this research work1.
• The tradeoff between performance and confidentiality loss
in signature-based air indexes is analyzed in terms of false
drop and false guess probabilities of the signatures.
• An analytical model is developed to analyze the impact of
different control parameters, which serves as a guidance for
configuring signatures to meet the performance and confiden-
tiality requirements of wireless data broadcast applications.
• The jump pointer technique and the XOR signature scheme
have been proposed to further improve the performance and
confidentiality of signature-based air indexes, respectively.
• Extensive experiments (based on both simulations and pro-
totyping on PDA) are conducted to validate our analysis and
to evaluate the examined signature schemes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II and
Section III present the preliminaries and related work of this
study, respectively. Section IV formulates the problem, and de-
fines/analyzes the metrics for performance and confidentiality, i.e.,
the false drop probability as well as the false guess probability.
Section V derives an analytical model that balances performance
and confidentiality in a secure wireless broadcast system, and
proposes the jump pointer technique and the XOR signature
scheme, two strategies to further improve the performance and
confidentiality of a signature-based system, respectively. Sec-
tion VI reports the simulation results to validate our analysis.
Finally, Section VII concludes this paper.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first give an overview of the signature
technique and its implementation in a wireless broadcast system,
and then describe the adopted system model and explain all the
assumptions we make.
A. Overview of the Signature Techniques
Data Signature     Si
Data Item:  Attr. 1: Security Attr. 2: Pervasive
001  100  001  001
Pervasive 101  000  100  001
Security
)
101  100  101  001
Query Q Query Signature SQ SQ    Si Results
Security 001 100 001 001
Hacker 000 101 000 101 000 100 000 001
001 100 001 001
Mobile 100 100 001 001 100 100 001 001
No Match
True Match
False Match
(a) Signature generation
(b) Query comparision
Fig. 1. Signature generation and comparison
1A preliminary report of this study appeared in Proc. the ACM 14-th
Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM’05) [23].
Signature techniques have been studied extensively in informa-
tion retrieval [15], [18]. Different from the term digital signature
used in the security context, a signature in the database context
is basically an abstract of the information in a data item, which
contains a set of attributes. Given a set of data items to be indexed
by multiple attributes, the signature Si of data item i is typically
formed by first hashing each indexed attribute in the data item
into a bit string and then superimposing (i.e., bitwise-OR, denoted
as ∨) all these bit strings into a signature. Note that the size of a
signature equals the size of the bit string. An example of signature
generation is depicted in Figure 1(a), in which each attribute is
hashed into a 12-bit string.
To process a query which contains one searched attribute, a
query signature SQ corresponding to the query Q is generated
first, based on the same hash function. Thereafter, SQ is compared
against the signatures of examined data items using bitwise-AND
(denoted as ∧). The signatures match if for every bit set in SQ,
the corresponding bit in the compared data signature Si is also
set. There are two possible outcomes of the comparison:
• SQ ∧ Si 6= SQ: data item i does not match query Q.
• SQ ∧ Si = SQ: a match has two possible implications:
– true match: the data item is really what the query
searches for; and
– false drop: the data item in fact does not satisfy the
search criteria although the signature comparison indi-
cates a match.
As shown in Figure 1(b), three queries are issued and their
corresponding signatures are produced based on the same hash
function. According to the result of SQ ∧ Si, the examined data
item is not qualified for the first query, Q1=Hacker, but qualified
for the other two queries, Q2=Security and Q3=Mobile. It is
a true match for Q2 as the data item does contain the attribute
Security while it is a false drop for Q3 because the data item
does not contain the queried attribute Mobile.
Bloom Filter, commonly used in networking, shares some
similarities as signature [3]. However, it adopts multiple hash
functions to generate bit strings. Given a bit string with wb bits
set to 1, it needs wb hash functions with one corresponding to
one bit. As a result, the generation and comparison of the bit
strings become more complicated and time-consuming that is not
suitable for the wireless broadcast systems.
B. System Model
Like most of the work in the literature, we, in this work,
assume a generic wireless data broadcast system that consists
of three parts: 1) a broadcast channel2; 2) the broadcast server;
and 3) mobile clients [25], [27], [28]. Figure 2 shows a high-
level overview of the system model. The broadcast server is
interfaced with other data sources via high speed networks and
thus can be considered as a logical data source for all the mobile
users in the system. The server is responsible for generating the
broadcast program, i.e., periodically encrypting and disseminating
data items to its clients via the shared broadcast channel. A
complete broadcast of data items is called a broadcast cycle. All
the items considered in this model consist of a set of searchable
attributes and a content body.
2The channel is an abstraction for a communication medium and it is used
as a generic term to refer to a computer network, satellite channel, TV channel,
radio channel or a virtual circuit over a cellular channel [14].
Fig. 2. A wireless data broadcast system.
The mobile clients also play an important role in the system
due to the client-side processing. Each client has to continuously
monitor the broadcast channel to receive the data items of interests
(as specified by user queries). Without any auxiliary information,
a client has to continuously listen to the channel for one complete
broadcast cycle, comparing the searchable attributes of each item
against the query predicates to process a query. Suppose only 5%
of the data items are qualified for the query, the retrieval of the
other 95% of data items may be redundant.
Signature techniques, well known for the ability to efficiently
filter the unqualified data against a query, have been proposed for
air indexing [17]. The idea is to put s data items into a group,
namely a data frame, and generate a signature for each data frame
via superimposing s signatures corresponding to s data items.
Compared with the data items in a data frame, a signature is
usually much smaller and hence the retrieval of a signature is
much cheaper than retrieval of the data frame. Consequently, in
a wireless broadcast system, the signatures and data frames are
interleaved, as shown in Figure 3.
S1 S2Data Frame Data Frame Sc Data Frame
Broadcast Cycle
Si Signature Data Frame Encrypted data item(s)
...
Fig. 3. Signature based air index
We assume that the hash function H adopted to generate the
signatures is known to all the clients. Whenever a client issues
a query and tunes into the channel, it generates the signature for
the query based on H , and waits for the first coming signature. In
order to facilitate the initial probing, we assume the data frame
and index information are packed into packets in the broadcast
channel and each packet contains a pointer to the next signature
packet. Consequently, a client knows when to wake up to receive
upcoming signatures. Thereafter, it retrieves the signature for
comparison. If the signature matches the query, it retrieves the
following data frame. Otherwise, it tunes into the doze mode and
only switches to the active mode when the next signature is about
to broadcast. The process continues for a complete broadcast
cycle.
For example, assume s = 1 (i.e., each data frame contains only
one data item) and the broadcast system is going to broadcast an
item i with security and pervasive as two key attribute values.
A client who issues a query Q may first retrieve the signature
Si = 101100101001 and compare that with its query signature SQ
to decide whether data item i satisfies the query. For example, a
client who issues Q1 = hacker can safely ignore the downloading
of the item as SQ1 ∧ Si 6= SQ1 . Another client who issues Q2
has to download the item because SQ2 ∧ Si = SQ2 , indicating
the item might satisfy the query.
Without loss of generality, we assume the wireless broadcast
system adopts various approaches to guarantee the integrity of
the broadcast data. The underlying wireless medium is secure
but open to the public. Consequently, both authorized users and
adversaries can retrieve the packets from the wireless channel.
In order to make sure only subscribed users can enjoy the
services, all the ‘data’ packets are encrypted using keys that are
known to the subscribed users while the index information (i.e.,
signatures) are broadcast in a non-encrypted form to facilitate
quick search and filtering. We assume the system adopts suitable
key management techniques to manage keys.
III. RELATED WORK
In this section, we first review the security issues related to
wireless broadcast, and then we briefly review other related work.
A. Secure Broadcast
Wireless data broadcast, an approach for delivering information
to a group of users simultaneously, has been adopted in many
applications. In this subsection, we review some security issues
and solutions related to wireless broadcast in the conventional
wireless broadcast scenarios and wireless sensor network (WSN)
scenarios, respectively. In the context of wireless broadcast sys-
tems, the security problems can be divided roughly into two
intertwined areas, i.e., secrecy and authentication. The former
is to guarantee that only the subscribers can receive and recover
the broadcast information while the unauthorized users cannot.
A simple approach is via information encryption. The latter is
to make sure that the received information is from the right
source/sender and most approaches rely on asymmetric digital
signatures3.
In a wireless sensor network, each sensor node communicates
with its neighbors via wireless broadcast. It shares similar security
concerns as traditional wireless broadcast systems, i.e., the con-
fidentiality of the transferred data should be guaranteed, and the
authentication of the source should be enabled. However, different
from wireless broadcast systems where the connection between a
user and the wireless channel is not affected by other users, each
sensor node contributes to the network topology which might be
dynamic. In addition, the sensor nodes have limited processing
power and energy which can be easily exhausted by intensive
computations. All these constraints introduce new challenges [4].
Symmetric key cryptography is the most feasible encryption
mechanism for node to node communication, and key pre-
distribution is a popular key management approach in WSN [5],
[6]. The main idea is to pre-install a limited number of keys in
sensor nodes prior to actual deployment. In the context of WSN,
it has to ensure good network connectivity through key sharing
and resilience to node/key captured by the enemy as well. Some
other related work includes TinySec [19] and µTESLA [21]. The
former develops mechanisms for link-level encryption, and the
latter is a protocol to provide authenticated broadcast for severely
resource-constrained environments.
Although the security issue has been studied in traditional
wireless broadcast systems as well as wireless sensor networks,
it is worth to note that all the existing approaches rely purely
3Note that while the term digital signature is similar to data signature
discussed in Figure 1, they are fundamentally different. This paper focuses
on data signature techniques.
on the cryptography techniques. Their main focus is to design
different cryptography related techniques against various attacks.
However, the focus of this work is to facilitate efficient search
while ensuring high confidentiality by configuring signature-based
air index. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
aims at integrating confidentiality protection with filtering/search
function using indexing techniques. As a data signature uses a bit
vector of fixed length to represent a set of attributes, uncertainty
between true matches and false drops is introduced. Uncertainty
may deteriorate the filtering efficiency of a data signature scheme.
However, it also offers an opportunity to encode information. In
the literature, all the existing work related to signature-based
indexing aims at reducing the false drop in order to improve
the filtering efficiency. In this paper, we analyze how to protect
confidentiality via increasing false drops and strike a balance
between performance and confidentiality.
B. Other Related Work
Wireless broadcast is a popular approach for disseminating
commonly interested information to clients to enable a simultane-
ous access [1]. Air indexing is widely adopted to conserve battery
power in mobile clients. Several tree-based indexing techniques,
such as flexible indexing and distributed tree indexing, for broad-
cast channels are proposed [12], [13]. However, these studies
focus on one-dimensional indexes for equality-based queries. The
processing of general queries with a semantics-based broadcast
approach is proposed [16], and the range query is studied in [22].
Traditional index techniques, such as hashing [13] and signature
file [9], are also applied in air indexing, along with hybrid
approach [10]. Besides the design of different indexing structures
for different scenarios, index organization algorithms are also
studied [14]. However, none of the above techniques addresses
any security issue.
On the other hand, security is a major concern in various ser-
vices and applications. The issues of protecting user privacy due
to insufficient anonymity are addressed by introducing dummy
users and controlling the update frequency/spatial resolution
in [2]. In [7], [8], a client-trusted middleware architecture is
assumed to transform requests from mobile clients into new
queries. In these work, a request based on a user position is
masked as a region request which will only be issued if there
are at least k requests from the same region. Thus, the location
service provider cannot deduce individual client position.
Security is also an important topic in mobile ad-hoc networks
(MANET). Due to the freedom of nodes to join, leave, and
move inside the network, MANET is vulnerable. Consequently,
different techniques have been proposed to protect against various
attacks [4]. For example, Watchdog and Pathrater have been
proposed to mitigate the routing mis-behaviors in MANET [20],
and a cluster-based intrusion detection technique for ad-hoc
network has been proposed [11]. However, key management and
cryptography are not the focus of this paper. We address the
confidentiality issue from data management aspect.
IV. PROBLEM FORMULATION
Our study aims at revealing important and practical insights on
design, deployment and administration of signature techniques in
wireless broadcast systems in order to address both performance
and data confidentiality concerns. We assume that the system
maintains a combined domain of indexed attributes, denoted as
DA, for searching data on air. In other words, data items main-
tained in the server are indexed by attributes in DA to facilitate
efficient search. In order to construct a broadcast program, the
system administrator chooses a hash function H for signature
generation, decides the number of attributes to be indexed in
signatures, and groups data items into data frames. Our goal is to
obtain a signature configuration which minimizes confidentiality
loss while not causing much performance deterioration. As the
foundation of this work, we, in this section, define the perfor-
mance and confidentiality metrics, and analyze the factors that
affect those metrics. Table I summarizes the notations used in
our analysis.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF SYMBOLS IN ANALYSIS
A an application;
DA the combined domain of indexed attributes in A;
DH the hacker’s dictionary;
N number of the data items included in a broadcast cycle;
C number of signatures in a broadcast cycle;
Cf number of matched signature due to false drops;
Ct number of matched signature due to true matches;
Cm′ number of signatures that do not match;
G number of total guesses based on a hacker’s dictionary;
Gf number of false guesses;
Gt number of correct guesses;
m number of bits in a signature;
n the size of the content body for each item;
u number of attributes indexed in a data item;
s number of data items included in a data frame;
wb number of 1’s in an attribute’s signature;
wf average number of 1’s in a data item’s signature;
Pf false drop probability;
Pg false guess probability;
A. Performance Metrics
Access time and tuning time have been widely used as perfor-
mance metrics in the studies of wireless data broadcast [14]. The
former represents the access latency and the latter estimates the
energy consumption in mobile clients. The index information can
save the retrieval of unwanted data items and hence it can improve
the tuning time performance. However, the index information also
consumes extra bandwidth which as a result extends the broadcast
cycle. As the result set to a query might contain multiple data
items, the client has to listen to the entire broadcast cycle to
avoid any miss of the right answer. Hence, the access time is
only affected by the bandwidth overhead incurred due to the
signature. From the access time point of view, the size of each
signature is preferred to be small. On the other hand, the tuning
time performance depends on the filtering ability of signatures.
As long as a signature shows a match, whether a true match or a
false drop, the data items have to be downloaded and decrypted
for further checking. Therefore, the false drop probability should
be reduced to improve the tuning time performance and hence
the energy consumption.
To be more specific, the access time, denoted as ACC, and the
tuning time, denoted as TUNE, are expressed in Equation (1)
and Equation (2), respectively. As we assume that the query
process is finished only when all the answer items are retrieved,
a client has to download all the signatures within one cycle and
the access time for a given query is one broadcast cycle, denoted
as CY CLE. In addition, the client needs to perform an initial
probe before a signature is received, denoted by PROBE, which
on average is a half of the summation of a data frame and its
signature. On the other hand, the tuning time is the time a client
stays active for the initial probe PROBE, scans all the signatures
within one cycle denoted by SIG, and retrieves all the matched
frames (including both true matches and false drops).
ACC = PROBE +CY CLE (1)
=
m+ n · s
2
+ C · (m+ n · s)
TUNE = PROBE + SIG+ Ct · n · s+ Cf · n · s (2)
=
m+ n · s
2
+ C ·m+ n · s · (Ct + Pf · (C − Ct))
Obviously, false drop probability Pf has a direct impact on the
tuning time performance. In order to have a better understanding
of those factors that might affect Pf , we conduct an analysis of
Pf . Semantically, Pf refers to the probability that the signature
of a data item matches the query signature, yet the data item
actually does not satisfy the query. Given a query Q, let Cm′ be
the number of signatures that do not match SQ, Ct be the true
matches, and Cf be the false drops with C = Ct + Cf + Cm′ .
False drop probability Pf is defined as the ratio of Cf to (C−Ct).
Pf =
Cf
C − Ct (3)
Since both the hash collision and superimposition of bit strings
in signature generation may cause false drops, we use Pf,col
and Pf,sup to denote the false drop probabilities caused by hash
collision and superimposition, respectively. In order to analyze
hash collision, a collision factor is used to denote the average
number of different inputs hashed into the same output. For an
application A, let CFA,sig denote the average number of data
items hashed into the same signature. Pf,col and Pf,sup can be
derived based on Equation (4) and Equation (5), respectively.
Please refer to [23] for detailed derivation. Here, comb(·, ·)
represents the binomial function.
Based on the above analysis, we obtain the following observa-
tions. First, given the fact that |DA| is limited, it is very likely
that CFA,sig is very close, if not equivalent to, 1. Take a common
setting as an example. With m = 64 and wb = 4, a total number of
comb(64, 4) = 635, 376 attributes can be indexed without causing
a hash conflict. Consequently, Pf,sup plays a very important role
in affecting Pf and hence the tuning time performance. Second,
Pf is closely related to the following factors: 1) the signature
length m, 2) the bit setting wb, 3) the number of indexed attributes
superimposed into a data signature u, and 4) the number of items
in an integrated group s. Therefore, by tuning these parameters,
the system can adjust Pf . More specific, Pf is increased if we
decrease m and/or increase u and/or s. The tuning of wb is
more complicated, which will be explored by our simulation in
Section VI.
Pf,col(DA) =
Cf
C − Ct =
Ct · (CFA,sig − 1)
comb(If , s)
≈
(
(
|DA|
|DA| − u )
s − 1
)
·
(
CFA,sig − 1
)
(4)
Pf,sup =
comb(wf , wb)
comb(m,wb)
≈ (1− e−
wb·u·s
m )wb (5)
B. Confidentiality Metric
From the confidentiality aspect, the fact that one signature can
match different queries introduces an uncertainty which actually
prevents attackers (also called hackers) from easily knowing
the indexed attribute values of data items. The hackers scan
the broadcast channel, download indexes and data items, and
try to guess the encrypted content of data items from indexing
information. Hence, when a hacker downloads a signature from
the broadcast channel, he might start a dictionary attack by using
all the attribute values in his dictionary DH to generate |DH |
signatures and compare each of them with a downloaded sig-
nature. Assuming that the attacker’s dictionary is comprehensive
(i.e., DA ⊆ DH ), she will find a set of matches in DH . Among
those matches, there are correct guesses and false guesses. In
order to quantify how much information has been leaked to
attackers, information leaking degree (ILD) is introduced as the
confidentiality metric in this paper. As defined in Equation (7),
ILD is the ratio of the number of correct guesses Gt to the total
number of matched guesses G (= Gt +Gf ).
Given a signature corresponding to u · s attributes, the number
of correct guesses is fixed (i.e., u · s) and that of false guesses
Gf depends on the false guess probability Pg . It is defined as the
probability that a dictionary value matches a signature of a data
frame but actually none of the data items included in the data
frame matches the dictionary value, as expressed in Equation (6).
Pg =
Gf
|DH | −Gt
(6)
ILD =
Gt
Gt +Gf
=
Gt
Gt + Pg · (|DH | −Gt) (7)
Similar to the false drop probability Pf , Pg is also affected
by both the hash collision and superimposition of bit strings
in signature generation. Let CFH denote the collision factor
associated with DH (usually much larger than DA), Gf can be
approximated by (CFH−1)·Gt. Therefore, false guess probability
caused by hash collision Pg,col(DH) is defined in Equation (8) and
that caused by superimposition Pg,sup is defined in Equation (9).
Pg,col(DH ) =
Gt · (CFH − 1)
|DH | −Gt
(8)
Pg,sup = Pf,sup (9)
The above analysis reveals some interesting findings. When
Pg = 0, the information leaking degree ILD is 100%. To
reduce ILD to 50%, Pg needs to be raised up to Gt|DH |−Gt .
This finding indicates a dependency between information leaking
degree and the false guess probability. In addition, it points out an
observation, i.e., having a reasonable false drop probability, which
behaves similarly as the false guess probability, is not such a bad
idea for the sake of confidentiality concerns, even though low
false drop probability is preferred from the performance point of
views.
V. SYSTEM TUNING
This study attempts to correlate performance and confidentiality
requirements of the signature-based air indexing techniques for
wireless broadcast systems and investigate the tradeoff between
them. Ideally, a secure wireless data broadcast system should
provide an efficient data access with minimal information leakage.
In other words, it requires the false drop probability Pf to
be small but false guess probability Pg to be large. However,
based on the analytical study conducted in previous section,
we understand both Pf and Pg share the same trend and it is
impossible to optimize both security and energy at the same time.
In order to balance the performance and confidentiality in the
signature-based system, we, in this section, first develop a cost
model to guide the signature configurations for various system
requirements. Thereafter, we present jump pointer technique and
XOR signature, two approaches that can improve the performance
and confidentiality, respectively.
A. Balance Performance with Confidentiality
Based on the analysis, we understand that there are four
parameters that can affect the performance and confidentiality,
including i) the number of bits in one signature m; ii) the fixed
number of bits set to 1 in a bit string wb; iii) the number of
attributes in a data item that contribute to the signature u; and iv)
the number of items that contribute to the signature s.
In many cases, the settings of m and u are relatively stable.
In traditional information retrieval applications, the size of the
signature, m, is set to a large value and the number of bits
set, wb, is carefully selected to provide a large space of hashed
bit strings and minimize hash collisions. However, for secure
wireless data broadcast systems, a long signature consumes too
much bandwidth and extends both access latency and tuning
time. Furthermore, a long signature may result in a higher ILD.
Consequently, the value of m usually is kept in a reasonable size
(e.g., 64 - 256 bits), and u is normally application-dependent. On
the other hand, the settings of wb and s are much more flexible.
The former can be tuned from 1 to m and the latter can be set to 1,
2, etc. In the following, we analyze how to tune these parameters
in order to optimize the overall system cost that considers both
confidentiality metric and performance metric.
We take an encrypted broadcast system which does not provide
any index information as a reference system. A client has to
retrieve all the packets in such an encrypted broadcast system.
Consequently, both tuning time and access time, defined as Tref
and Aref respectively, equal a complete broadcast cycle, as
defined in Equation (10). When the index is provided, the client
may save the retrieval of some unnecessary data frames and hence
the tuning time performance is improved. Nevertheless, the index
information occupies extra bandwidth which extends the access
time. In order to quantify the performance gain, Equation (11)
is defined. Here, the tuning time/access time under the reference
system are used as the baseline performance, and the parameter
δ, ranging over [0, 1], is used to adjust the importance between
the tuning time performance and access time performance. On the
other hand, a plain index may release some information of the
encrypted data and hence cause information leakage. Taking both
the performance gain and confidentiality loss into consideration,
the normalized system cost is defined in Equation (12). The first
term Cper stands for the performance, and the second term ILD
is the confidentiality metric. The parameter α, ranging over [0, 1],
assigns different weights to performance and confidentiality. The
larger α is, the more important the performance is considered. It
is noticed that the cost under the reference system is zero.
Tref = Aref =
n
2
+N · n (10)
Cper = δ · TUNE − Tref
Tref
+ (1− δ) · ACC − Aref
Aref
(11)
Cnor = α · Cper + (1− α) · ILD (12)
Based on Equation (1), only the parameter s, but not wb, has
an impact on the access time performance. It is observed that as
s increases, the probe time (i.e., PROBE) gets extended while
the broadcast cycle (i.e., CY CLE) is shorten. Given two settings
of s, denoted as s1 and s2, the difference of the corresponding
access time is
△ = ACCs1 − ACCs2 = (s1 − s2) ·
(n
2
− m ·N
s1 · s2
) (13)
Without loss of generality, we assume s1 = s + 1 and s2 = s
and Equation (13) can be reexpressed as shown in Equation (14).
Initially, △ is negative which means an increase of s reduces the
access time. This is because the benefit of reduced broadcast cycle
pays off the cost of extended probe time. However, as s · (s+ 1)
value increases, △ becomes positive which means a further
increase of s actually extends the access time. Consequently,
the best access time performance can be achieved when △ is
about to change its value from negative to positive, denoted as
sacc. According to quadratic formula, sacc can be derived as in
Equation (15).
△ = s · (s+ 1) · n− 2 ·m ·N
2 · s · (s+ 1) (14)
sacc =
√
n2 − 8 · n ·m ·N − n
2 · n (15)
However, the setting of s also affects false drop probability Pf .
As s increases, Pf increases as well. When s becomes too large, it
is very likely that all the bits of a signature are set to 1. Hence, the
signature loses its filtering capability and it will anyway indicate
a match for any query. In other words, the signature with all the
bits set to 1 forces the user to retrieve each single data item,
no matter whether it satisfies the query or not. Consequently, the
value of s should be carefully selected. In order to simplify our
discussions, we assume the possible values of s vary in a small
range (e.g., {1, 2, 4}).
Next, we analyze the impact of the parameter wb on the system
cost. The system cost under fixed u, m and s is defined in
Equation (16). As the first term, i.e., α · δ · SIGTref , and the third
term, i.e., α · (1 − δ) · ACC−ArefAref , are constant under fixed u,
m and s, Cnor with various wb is affected by α · δ · C
′
m·n·s
Tref
and (1 − α) · ILD. In other words, Cnor is minimized when
(1− α) · ILD − α · δ · C
′
m·n·s
Tref
(denoted as θ) is minimized.
Cnor = α · δ · SIG
Tref
− α · δ · C
′
m · n · s
Tref
+ (16)
α · (1− δ) · ACC − Aref
Aref
+ (1− α) · ILD
θ = (1− α) · ILD − α · δ · C
′
m · n · s
Tref
(17)
=
(1− α) ·Gt
Gt + Pg · (|DH | −Gt)
+
α · δ · n · s
Tref
· Pf · (C − Ct)
−α · δ · n · s · (C − Ct)
Tref
As shown in Equation (17), θ is affected by false drop prob-
ability Pf and false guess probability Pg . Recall that, as our
analysis in Section IV shows, Pf and Pg are correlated, with
Pf,sup = Pg,sup. Without loss of generality, we assume that a
proper signature generating function usually offers a near-zero
hash collision, i.e., Pf,col ≈ 0 and Pg,col ≈ 0. For example, a hash
function with m = 64 and wb = 4 can generate comb(64, 4) ≈
6.4×105 unique signatures and that with m = 128 and wb = 4 can
generate comb(128, 4) ≈ 107 unique signatures. Consequently,
we assume when the normalized cost is minimized, Pf ≈ Pg = p
and hence we can derive the value of p (i.e., Pf and Pg) according
to quadratic formula, as derived in Equation (18).
p =
√
b2 − 4 · a · c− b
2 · a (18)
where a = α · δ · n · s · (C − Ct) · (|DH | −Gt)
b = α · δ · n · s · (C − Ct) ·Gt
c = −(1− α) ·Gt · Tref
If a range of s, denoted as Rs, is given, we can derive the
optimal cost Cnor under each s ∈ Rs, denoted as Cnor(s). The
best setting of s is set to the one s′ with minimal cost, i.e., ∀s ∈
Rs, Cnor(s) ≥ Cnor(s′).
B. Jump Pointer Technique
Although the signature-based approach can skip the download
of some unnecessary data items by carefully tuning the false
drop probability Pf , it still requires the mobile clients to listen
to all the signatures in order to avoid any false match. Take a
broadcast cycle containing 10000 data items with s = 1 as an
example. Suppose only 5% of the data items satisfy the query
and the estimated false drop probability Pf is 0.5, the number
of signatures that do not match the query Cm′ is 4750. In other
words, among 10000 signatures, 4750 signatures do not match the
query and hence the retrieval and comparison of those signatures
do not contribute to the query result.
In addition, the value of Cm′ also affects the switching cost.
Air indexing techniques aim at keeping the mobile clients in
doze mode as long as possible and only switching them back
to active mode when the data of interest are broadcast. Although
most, if not all, of the existing works in the literature neglect the
energy overhead incurred by mode switching, it is observed that
the typical setup time for a mobile device to start or tune into
active mode is, while device-dependent, usually in the order of
100 µs [24]. Consequently, the switching cost in terms of energy
consumption is not negligible. As Cm′ increases, the number of
switches goes up as well. Therefore, it is desirable to reduce Cm′
value in order to reduce the tuning time and switching cost and
hence the energy consumption.
Cm′ (= C − Ct − Cf ) can be reduced if Cf is increased.
Consequently, a straightforward approach is to introduce more
false drops as Cf = Pf · (C −Ct). However, this approach is not
appealing as each false drop requires the client to retrieve and to
decrypt corresponding data frame that significantly extends the
tuning time. Thus, we propose a simple but novel approach to
tackle this issue, namely the jump pointer technique. The basic
idea is that when the broadcast server schedules the data items
for broadcast, it has the full knowledge of the indexed attributes
for each data frame and hence it knows whether two data frames
can satisfy the same query. Given two frames f1 and f2, we
assume their corresponding signatures are s1 and s2, and the
corresponding attribute lists are As1 and As2 . If As1∩As2 = ∅, f2
will not satisfy any query that f1 satisfies. For a given query Q, if
f1 truly matches it, the retrieval of f2 can be safely ignored. Based
on this knowledge, it associates a pointer, namely jump pointer
pj , to each signature s, pointing to the next (closest) signature s′
in the broadcast cycle that might satisfy the same query as s, i.e.,
As ∩As′ 6= ∅.
S1
(w1, w3)
Data 
Item(s)
S2
(w2, w4)
Data 
Item(s)
S3
(w1, w5)
Data 
Item(s)
Si Signature
Encrypted 
data item(s)
Data 
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Fig. 4. Example jump pointer
Figure 4 depicts an example, in which the jump pointer
associated with the signature s1 points to s3, as As1 ∩ As2 = ∅
and As1 ∩As3 = {w1}. Here, wi represents an indexed attribute
value and the set of wi inside the parenthesis below each signature
sj represents Asj . For example, the signature s1 is generated
based on w1 and w3, and the signature s2 is generated by w2
and w4. Suppose a client issues a query q = {w1}, and s1 is
the first complete signature it receives. As s1 matches the query
signature sq , it downloads the data frame and finds a true match.
Consequently, it can skip the signature s2 and its data frame (in
doze mode) by following the jump pointer pj to access s3. The
jump pointer technique does not cause any false miss, as proved
by Lemma 1.
Lemma 1: The jump pointer technique is free of false misses.
Suppose a query q on attribute aq finds a true match at signature
Si, and it follows the jump pointer to access signature Sj . All
the data frames broadcast between Si and Sj do not contribute
to the result set of q. 
Proof. Suppose that there is a data item d (associated with a
signature Sd) broadcast between Si and Sj satisfies the query
q, i.e., item d has aq as one of its indexed attribute values.
Consequently, Sd must have its indexed attributes list Asd include
aq, i.e., ad ∈ ASd . As the query q finds a true match at signature
si, the indexed keywords list ASi contains aq as well. As a
result, aq ∈ (ASi ∩ ASd) and ASi ∩ ASd 6= ∅. Consequently,
the jump pointer with si will not point to Sj , which contradicts
our assumption. 
Let |DA| be the size of the combined domain of indexed
attributes, s be the number of data items included into one data
frame, and u be the number of attributes indexed for each data
item, the probability ρ that two given data frames might satisfy the
same query can be approximated by Equation (19). For example,
when |DA| = 1000, u = 10, and s = 1, ρ = 0.092 which
means a jump pointer on average points to the signature that
is 1ρ = 10.4 data frames apart away from the current one. Given
a dataset containing C data items, one broadcast cycle has Cs
data frames with each having s·u
|DA|
probability to match a specific
query. Consequently, the jump pointer technique can save roughly
Cs =
C
s × s·u|DA| ×
1
ρ signature retrievals. Among those Cs saved
signature retrievals, some might match the query while the others
do not. Consequently, Cs affects both false drops Cf and the
number of signatures that do not match the query Cm′ . Based on
the assumption that the ratio of Cf to Cm′ does not change, the
false drop probability remains, as proved by Lemma 2.
ρ = 1− comb(|DA| − s · u, s · u)
comb(|DA|, s · u)
(19)
Lemma 2: The jump index technique reduces the total number
of index signatures checked, but it does not change the false drop
probability. 
Proof. Without the jump pointer, Pf = CfC−Ct . If we assume
Cf
Cm′
= a, Pf =
Cf
Cf+Cm′
= aa+1 . When the jump pointer is
provided, Ct remains but both Cf and Cm′ are reduced to C′f and
C′m′ . Let △1 = Cf −C′f , △2 = Cm′ −C′m′ , and Cs = △1 +△2
(i.e., the number of total signature checks saved). Assume C
′
f
C′
m′
remains a, the new false drop probability P ′f can be derived as
follows.
P ′f =
Cf −△1
Cf −△1 + Cm′ −△2
=
a · Cm′ − aa+1 · Cs
a · Cm′ + Cm′ −Cs
=
a
a+ 1
Consequently, P ′f = Pf . 
On the other hand, a concern for this jump pointer technique
is the potential information leaking to the hackers, if they know
pj points to a data frame that shares some common attribute
values. Note that the hacker does not have a way to obtain this
jump pointer from signatures if the jump pointer is maintained
as part of the encrypted information frame. Nevertheless, we
analyze its potential impact under a worst case scenario, where
the jump pointer is known to the hackers. The jump pointer
connects two signatures Si and Sj with ASi ∩ ASj 6= ∅ via
pj . A hacker, in addition to performing the dictionary attack
described in Section IV-B, may attempt to guess the common
attributes indexed by both signatures. Let GSi /GSj represent the
sets of signatures from the hacker’s dictionary that match Si/Sj .
GSi ∩ GSj gives a superset of all the attributes that indexed by
both Si and Sj . The experiments to be presented in Section VI
will demonstrate that the knowledge of GSi ∩GSj ⊇ ASi ∩ASj
does not cause any serious information leakage.
C. XOR Signature
In the above subsections, we focus on the signature-based air
index scheme in which only the data but not the index are en-
crypted. On the one hand, broadcasting index in a non-encrypted
form simplifies the step of index retrieval and query processing.
Without any expensive decryption operation, the consumption of
power resource at client’s side can be significantly reduced. On
the other hand, it potentially leaves a door open to the attackers
since the attackers can obtain some hints from the plain index. In
this subsection, we present the XOR signature scheme to further
reduce the information leakage without affecting the performance.
In what follows, we present the basic idea in detail with an
analytical model to derive the new false guess probability with
confidentiality improvement.
The basic idea is motivated by the fact that a bit string, after
two XOR (denoted as ⊕) operations with the same bit string, can
be recovered4. In other words, (A ⊕ B) ⊕ B = A ⊕ (B ⊕ B) =
A⊕0 = A. If there is a string B which is only known to authorized
clients and servers, but not attackers, each signature S broadcast
on the channel can be encrypted based on string B to form a new
bit string S′ = S⊕B. When clients receive the index, the original
signature S can be recovered by XOR with B, i.e., S′ ⊕B = S.
Note that the real data items in our model are encrypted, and each
client knows the keys to decrypt the data. Therefore, the secret
keys ki are the best candidates for string B which do not incur
any extra management overhead. Furthermore, the XOR operation
4XOR represents a operation on two operands that results in a value of true
if and only if two operands share different values, i.e., 1⊕1 = 0, 0⊕0 = 0,
1 ⊕ 0 = 1, and 0 ⊕ 1 = 1.
between two strings A and B only needs to compare two strings
bit by bit once that is much cheaper than the normal decryption
process. Our simulations, based on a real PDA to be presented in
Section VI-D, will further demonstrate the difference.
Data Signature S 101  100  101 
101  001  010  110         Key ki
+ )   100  110  011 
(a) Example 1: j = 3
Data Signature S
+ ) 001  101  010
111  010  100  001       Key kj
101  100  101 
111  010  100  001       
(b) Example 2: j = 6
Fig. 5. Encrypt signatures based on xor operation
Figure 5 shows two examples for signature encryption based on
XOR operation, with the alignment position changing. Suppose
there are a list of keys ki used in the broadcast system, and a
dynamic parameter j is set to (ti · r)%K. Here, ti means the
time when the i-th frame in a broadcast cycle is going to be
broadcast, r is a system-wide parameter, and K represents the
number of keys. Consequently, we can reuse kj to encrypt the
signature. We further vary the alignment position dynamically
to make the recovering of keys harder, if not impossible. For
example, as shown in Figure 5(a), the j-th bit of the key kj
is aligning with the first bit of the signature, with j = 3, i.e.,
101100101 ⊕ 001010110 = 100110011. Instead of broadcasting
the plain signature 101100101, the server broadcasts the encrypted
signature 100110011 and the authorized users can recover the
original signature using the key k3. In case that after alignment,
the key kj does not have enough remaining bits to match with
the signature, we can expand kj by appending the same key at
the end of kj . An example is depicted in Figure 5(b).
It is obvious that the confidentiality improvement does not
change the setting of the signature. All the users can recover
the original signature index based on XOR operation. As a
result, it does not affect the false drop probability and hence
the performance. On the other hand, the plain signature S is
covered by the secret key kj . Consequently, it is much harder for
the attackers to guess the right information from the encrypted
signature S′ (= S ⊕ kj). If the attacker only knows the hash
function to produce the signature, what he can do is to conduct
a dictionary attack based on the received signatures S′s, as
described in Section IV-B. According to XOR operation, a bit
set to 1 in the original signature S will remain the value 1 only
when the corresponding bit of the secret key is set to 0. Without
loss of generality, we assume the secret key has equal numbers of
bits 1 and 0, i.e., only m/2 bits over the m-bit of the key are set
to 0. Therefore, the possibility that wb bits set to 1 corresponding
to an indexed attribute can remain the value 1 even after the XOR
operation is ( 12 )
wb
. As a result, the number of true guess G′t can
be approximated as follows.
G′t =
{
( 12 )
wb × s× u wb ≤ m2
0 otherwise
Furthermore, XOR a bit with value 0 from the original signature
S and a bit with value 1 from the secret key can also produce 1.
On average, there are (m − wf ) bits with value 0 in S, and the
corresponding bits in the key on average have 50% probability
to be 1. As a result, the total number of bits set to 1 in S′
is wf2 +
m−wf
2 =
m
2 . The total number of matched guess G
′
thereafter can be approximated as follows. It is worth noticing
that when wb exceeds the value of m2 , no match is found. This is
because a received signature S′, whose total number of bits set
to 1 is guaranteed to be m2 , can not match a signature in hacker’s
dictionary with wb larger than m2 .
G′ =


comb(
wf
2
+
m−wf
2
,wb)
comb(m,wb) × |DH | wb ≤
m
2
0 otherwise
Finally, the false guess probability P ′g with confidentiality
improvement can be derived as follows.
P ′g =
(G′ −G′t)
|DH | −G′t
(20)
In order to provide a complete description, we further assume
that attackers are so smart that they successfully guess that the
received signatures S′ are the XOR results of the real signatures
S and some other strings, i.e., S′ = S ⊕ A. Since the string A
must be known to both the server and all the clients, attackers
can further guess that different Ss are encrypted based on one
string A in order to minimize the management cost of string A.
Consequently, they may be able to remove string A by combining
two received signatures S′1 and S′2 based on XOR operation, i.e.,
S′1 ⊕ S′2 = (S1 ⊕ A) ⊕ (S2 ⊕ A) = (S1 ⊕ S2) ⊕ (A ⊕ A)=(S1 ⊕
S2) ⊕ 0=(S1 ⊕ S2). Although our system adopts different keys
and different alignments to encrypt the signatures, we assume a
worst case scenario in which the XOR result of some signatures
S1 and S2 can be recovered. However, even with this knowledge,
the attacker still has to suffer from a higher false guess probability.
This is because for a given bit string S with m bits, there are 2m
different strings that can produce S based on XOR operation. As
a result, it is almost impossible for an attacker to guess the right
answer, especially when m is sufficiently large.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
As discussed earlier, a signature-based wireless broad-
cast system can be flexibly tuned to meet different perfor-
mance/confidentiality requirements. In this section, we conduct
extensive experiments via simulations to verify the analytical
results, and demonstrate the flexibility of signature-based air
index. All the experiments are implemented in C language in
a Unix system. As shown in Table II, the application domain
DA has 1, 000 attributes and we assume the broadcast cycle
consists of 10, 000 data items, with each item characterized by u
indexed attributes randomly drawn from DA. On the other hand,
the attacker’s dictionary DH contains 10, 000 attributes which
is a superset of DA (i.e., we made a conservative assumption
from the administrator’s standpoint). The signature size, m, is
set to 64, 128, and 256 bits and the content body of each item,
n, is set to 1280 bits, with mn =5%/10%/20%. Although in the
real applications the size of the signature and the content body
might be much larger, we believe mn =5%/10%/20% is consistent
with many real applications. Consequently, our parameter settings
simulate representative cases of real applications. By changing the
value of s and tuning wb from 1 to m, the system administrator
can generate different configurations of signatures.
The experimental results presented here are the average per-
formance of 200 queries, each of which is based on a random
attribute value drawn from DA. The false drop probability Pf and
false guess probability Pg are obtained by both experiments and
TABLE II
SIMULATION SETTINGS
Notation Description Settings
|DA|
domain size of index attributes of a
given application A 1000
|DH | domain size of the hacker’s dictionary 10000
u number of attributed index in one item 4, 8, 10, 12
N
number of the data items included in a
broadcast cycle 10000
m number of bits in a signature 64, 128, 256
n
the size of a data item content body in
the unit of bits
1280
s
number of data items in an integrated
data group 1, 2, 4
wb number of 1’s in an attribute’s signature [1,m]
Ps selectivity of a query 0.01
analysis for validation. The access time/tuning time is obtained
by Equation (1)/Equation (2) and the ILD for each broadcast
data item is experimentally obtained by counting the number
of correct guesses and the number of total guesses. We have
conducted five sets of experiments. The first set of experiments
is to validate the analytical results of signature-based air index.
As it has been presented in the preliminary report [23], it is
skipped for space saving. The second set of experiments is
to tune the signature in order to balance the performance and
confidentiality, the third and fourth sets of experiments are to
evaluate the effectiveness of the jump pointer technique and the
XOR signature, respectively. Finally, the last set of experiments is
to implement the signature-based approach in a real PDA to verify
that encryption is expensive and to validate that the signature-
based secure broadcast technique can significantly cut down the
power consumption.
A. Balancing Performance and Security
As we mentioned in Section V, tuning of wb is more flexible
than that of s. In this set of experiments, we first validate the
analytical model proposed to achieve a good balance between
confidentiality and performance with a fixed s. Thereafter, we
present the results under different s values.
First, the relationship between Cnor and wb for various m
value with s = 1 is shown in Table III. As the access time
is not affected by wb, we set the δ value to 1 and hence only
the tuning time performance but not the access time contributes
to Cnor. It is observed that the analytical results approach the
simulation results, especially for the Cnor values. For the detailed
wb setting, the simulation result does not match perfectly with the
analytical results. The main reason is that our analytical model
presented in Section V-A actually derives the best Pf (i.e., Pg)
value that minimizes the cost Cnor and then based on the value
of Pf to derive wb. However, as reported previously in [23], there
is a gap between the analytical Pf (Pg) and real Pf (Pg), and
that difference causes the mismatch of wb settings. However, the
analytical results still can provide useful hints. In those systems
with dynamic system settings, it is always very expensive to get
the optimized wb via simulation especially when m is large.
Consequently, the analytical model provides an alternative tool
for performance analysis and system planning.Secondly, we verify the analytical model under different system
requirements. Here, we change both the setting of α and the
setting of δ to obtain a thorough understanding of the impact of
both s and wb. The optimized settings, together with Cnor values,
TABLE III
OPTIMAL CONFIGURATIONS OF SIGNATURE SCHEME (s = 1, δ = 1)
m α
Analysis Results Simulation Results
wb Cnor wb Cnor
64
0.25 6 −0.2101 5 −0.2103
0.5 4 −0.4433 4 −0.4414
0.75 4 −0.6851 4 −0.6728
128
0.25 31 −0.1976 26 −0.1956
0.5 27 −0.4183 23 −0.4145
0.75 22 −0.6475 21 −0.6411
256
0.25 88 −0.1726 72 −0.1788
0.5 81 −0.3684 67 −0.3792
0.75 76 −0.5727 63 −0.5873
of the system with m = 64 and s ∈ {1, 2, 4} are presented in
Table IV. We report the performance for each s value, and those in
bold represent the settings that minimize the system cost. Initially,
we set both α and δ to be pretty small, and hence the system
cost is dominated by the confidentiality loss. Consequently, a
system with small ILD (i.e., large false guess probability Pg)
is preferred. That’s why when we compare the optimal setting
under α = δ = 0.1 with that under α = δ = 0.5, we observe
the wb value related to α = δ = 0.1 is much larger. Overall, the
signature with s = 1 is preferred.
However, as α value increases, performance gains start to
dominate the system cost. For example, when α = 0.9 and
δ = 0.1, the signature with s = 2 provides the minimal cost.
As we further increase the weight of performance, especially the
importance of access time, the signature with s = 4 outperforms
the best and becomes the optimal choice. This is consistent
with our previous analysis. The value of s mainly affects the
access time, while wb affects the false guess probability/false drop
probability and hence it determines the tuning time performance
and ILD. When the short access time is the ONLY system
requirement, a large s is preferred. On the other hand, when the
confidentiality loss is the major system requirement, a small s is
more suitable.
TABLE IV
OPTIMAL CONFIGURATIONS OF SIGNATURE SCHEMES (s ∈ {1, 2, 4}, AND
m = 64)
α δ s
Analysis Results Simulation Results
wb Cnor wb Cnor
0.10 0.10
4 3 0.0033 3 0.0034
2 7 0.0011 7 0.0011
1 17 0.0010 15 0.0010
0.50 0.50
4 1 −0.1219 1 −0.1174
2 2 −0.1780 2 −0.1757
1 5 −0.2026 4 −0.2029
0.90 0.10
4 1 −0.0354 1 −0.0339
2 2 −0.0468 2 −0.0459
1 4 −0.0387 4 −0.0387
0.99 0.01
4 1 0.0074 1 0.0075
2 2 0.0172 2 0.0172
1 4 0.0402 4 0.0402
B. Evaluation on Jump Pointer Technique
This set of experiments is to evaluate the performance of the
jump pointer technique. The notation With Jump Pointer is to
represent the signature-based air index with jump pointers, while
Without Jump Pointer denotes the conventional signature-based
air index. As we explain in Section V-B, a client has to scan all
the C/s signatures to evaluate a query under the conventional
signature-based approach. On the other hand, the jump pointer
links each signature s to the next closest signature s′ that shares
common attributes with s. Consequently, once a query finds a true
match with a signature si of the i-th data frame, it can follow the
jump pointer to access the next signature sj that might satisfy the
query. As a result, the retrievals of signatures broadcast between
the i-th data frame and the j-th data frame can be safely skipped.
Figure 6 depicts the average number of signature retrievals
incurred by processing a query under different u setting, with
m fixed at 64 and s fixed at 1. It is noticed that without any jump
pointer, the number of signature retrievals equals C/s = 10000,
and jump pointers can reduce the number of signatures checked.
It is observed that the improvement is dependent on u, which is
consistent with the analysis conducted in Section V-B. When u
is small, it is less likely that two signatures share some common
attributes and hence the average distance between a signature s
and the one pointed by s’s jump pointer is larger which results
in a more significant saving of the signature retrievals.
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Fig. 6. No. of signatures retrieved with jump pointers (m = 64,s = 1)
To more precisely demonstrate the advantage of the jump
pointer technique in terms of energy conserving, we obtain the
average power consumptions with/without jump pointers. We
adopt the numbers from Proxim RangeLAN2 [24], which requires
1.5W in transmit mode, 0.75W in receive mode and 0.01W in
doze mode, to approximate the energy consumption in retrieving
signatures and data items. The average power consumption per
query processing can be approximated by TUNEB × 0.75 +
(ACC−TUNE)
B × 0.01. Here, B represents the bandwidth of the
broadcast channel whose value is set to 1Mbps. Figure 7 depicts
the average energy consumption under different u/wb values, with
m = 64 and s = 1. As expected, the jump pointer technique can
significantly reduce the energy consumption. For example, when
u = 4 and wb = 10, jump pointers can save energy consumption
up to 23.5%, compared with that without jump pointers.
In the above analysis, we do not consider the switching cost,
as most of the existing work. However, it is observed that the
typical setup time for a mobile device to start or tune into active
mode is in the order of 100µs [24], which might consume non-
neglectable energy. As the jump pointer technique effectively
reduces the number of signature retrievals, it can reduce the
number of switches as well. Here, both a transition from the
active mode to doze mode and vice versa are counted as a switch.
Figure 8 plots the average switches incurred during the processing
of one query, with m = 64 and s = 1, and Figure 9 depicts the
average power consumption with switching cost considered. Here,
we vary the setup time from 1µs, to 10µs, to 100µs, and finally
to 1ms, and we assume it requires a mobile device 0.75W for
setup, the same as in the receive mode. Compared with the energy
consumption shown in Figure 7, the switching cost is obviously
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Fig. 7. Energy consumption with/without jump pointers (m = 64,s = 1)
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Fig. 9. Energy consumption with switching overhead (m = 64, wb = 30, s = 1)
non-neglectable.
C. Evaluation on XOR Signature
This set of experiments is conducted to validate the analytical
results of the XOR signature approach, with all the system
parameters sharing the same settings described in Table II. It is
observed that pre-defined metric ILD is no longer suitable with
confidentiality improvement, because in many cases the number
of matched guesses G is zero. Consequently, a new metric, namely
recall, is defined as the ratio of the number of right guesses to
the total number of attributes indexed by the signature. In other
words, recall equals the percentage of the indexed attributes that
are known to the hackers, and a small recall indicates a high
confidentiality.
Figure 10 shows the experimental results, as well as the analyti-
cal results when m equals 64. It is observed that the approximated
results obtained from theoretical analysis match the simulation
results perfectly. Take Figure 10(a) as an example, the average
difference between analytical and experimental results is around
4×10−6. The second observation is that the false guess probability
P ′g in most cases is zero. In Section V-A, we have claimed that
an ideal broadcast system prefers a small tuning time/access time
with large false guess probability. Does this mean that the XOR
signature with an almost-zero false guess probability leaks more
useful information to the attackers? The answer is definitely NO.
Although the almost-zero false guess probability reflects a fact
that the number of false guesses G′f is zero, it ignores the fact
that the total number of matched guesses G′ is almost zero as
well. That’s why we introduce the new metric recall to capture
the number of true guesses G′t, which can help to derive the total
number of guesses G′ = G′t + G′f = G′t + P ′g × (|DH | −G′t) =
recall × s× u+ P ′g × (|DH | − recall × s× u).
The third observation is that recall is almost zero in the XOR
signature scheme, as shown in Figure 10(b) and Figure 10(d). In
normal signature scheme, we assume all the indexed attributes
are available in hacker’s dictionary. In other words, the number
of true guesses always equals the number of attributes indexed
by a signature, i.e., Gt = s × u. Therefore, the recall is always
100%. However, it can successfully confuse the hacker by the
XOR operation and the number of true guesses, in most cases,
is zero. Both theoretical analysis and experiments show that the
XOR signature scheme effectively prevents the attackers from
getting useful information from the received signature. Under
open (i.e., non-encrypted) signature scheme, the system does not
try to avoid the true match from the hackers. Instead, it tries
to tune the inherited false drop from the signature scheme to
lower the percentage of the true matches over the total matches.
On the other hand, the XOR signature scheme prevents the true
match from happening at the first place. In our evaluation, the
performance results under m = 128 and m = 256 are similar and
hence are not presented to save space.
D. Empirical Evaluation on PDA
The focus of this paper is to employ and tune the signature-
based air index to balance confidentiality and performance in
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Fig. 10. Security of the XOR signature scheme (m = 64,u = 10)
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Fig. 11. CPU time for running 106 queries of different approaches (s = 1)
wireless broadcast systems. An arising question is why not broad-
cast encrypted index information directly which will eliminate
most of, if not all, confidentiality concerns. The main reason
is that the decryption performed at the thin clients (e.g., PDA
or mobile phone) is very expensive. While encryption/decryption
can address some security concerns, it deteriorates performance
significantly. In order to demonstrate the inefficiency of encryp-
tion/decryption operation and the significant improvement brought
by signature-based schemes, we implement the algorithms in a
real mobile device, SHARP PDA (as shown in Figure 12(a)). The
detailed system specification of the PDA is listed in Figure 12(b).
OpenSSL toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/) is used to implement
encryption/decription operations.
Three schemes, namely encryption, signature, and XOR signa-
ture, are evaluated. In all three algorithms, the server interleaves
index and data frames on the broadcast channel. The client is
supposed to check index first before spending time retrieving the
real data, which is much larger than index in size. We further
assume all the registered clients share a key with the server,
and the server encrypts all the data using that key. The first
algorithm encrypts index, as well as all the data, using this
common key. When a client issues a query, it downloads the
index, decrypts it, and compares it against its query. The other
two schemes only encrypt data, but not index. Signature scheme
broadcasts plain index (i.e., signature of the corresponding data),
and XOR signature scheme broadcasts the XOR product of the
plain signature and a key. Once the index is downloaded, the
client can compare the query with the plain index directly without
any additional operation in signature scheme. On the other hand,
clients first need to XOR the key with retrieved index to remove
the shield from the key, and then compare the result with their
queries under XOR signature scheme. In all three schemes, the
retrieval of the data is triggered only when a match between the
query and signature is detected.
Collecting power consumption data is not easy. As a result,
in this set of experiments, we evaluate the CPU time used by
different approaches instead of measuring the power consumption
directly. The total CPU cost of running 1 million (106) queries
of different approaches is shown in Figure 11. It is obvious that
the encryption/decryption approach incurs a much higher CPU
(a)
OS Linux
Processor Intel XScale PXA270
Processor Speed 416MHz
Hard Drive 4GB
Installed ROM 16MB
Installed RAM 64MB
Battery Type Lithium ion
(b) Product Specification
Fig. 12. SHARP Zaurus SL C3100
cost, around 1054.03 times larger than that of signature approach
and 881.31 times larger than that of XOR signature approach.
In addition, we can find out that the larger the m is, the longer
the CPU time is, which is consistent with our expectation. The
value of m plays a more important role on the CPU time of the
signature approach and the XOR signature approach, compared
with the encryption/decryption approach. The reason behind is
that the decryption algorithms in general are very complicated
and reducing m value does not simplify the operation. On the
other hand, the signature scheme and the XOR signature scheme
only employ very simple bit-operations (e.g., AND/XOR). This
observation well justifies our argument that encryption/decryption
significantly affects the performance. On the other hand, both the
signature approach and the XOR signature approach employ very
simple bit operations and therefore the incurred computation cost
is very low, which guarantees the efficiency of the approaches.
VII. CONCLUSION
Air indexing is an important technique that facilitates energy
conservation of mobile clients in wireless broadcast systems.
However, the crucial confidentiality issues on air indexing have
not been discussed in the literature. This study, to the best of our
knowledge, is the first research effort to address both performance
and confidentiality issues via indexing techniques in wireless data
broadcast systems.
In this paper, we argue that signature-based air index is an ideal
technique to meet the performance and confidentiality require-
ments of applications because the tradeoff between performance
and confidentiality metrics can be properly tuned by system
administrators. We define a security metrics called information
leaking degree to measure confidentiality loss in air indexes and
analyze both confidentiality and performance metrics in terms of
a number of controllable parameters. We further propose the jump
pointer technique and the XOR signature scheme to improve the
performance and the confidentiality, respectively.
This is a new research direction which deserves more effort
from the research community. We are developing new air indexing
techniques for secure wireless data broadcast and performing
more detailed analysis. Both of the performance and confiden-
tiality aspects of wireless data broadcast will be further exploited
in our future study.
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